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Abstract
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual
task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a
model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications
of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of
agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are
paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types
sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats
to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compen-
sation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of
the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects
sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload
of clients.
Keywords: street-level bureaucracy, sorting, altruism, personnel
policy, pay-for-performance.
JEL-codes: J3, J4, L3, M5
∗We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by Josse Delfgaauw, Jeffrey
Smith, Carolyn Heinrich, Bernd Fitzenberger and other participants to the International
Workshop on "Vouchers, Contracting-out and Performance Standards: Market Mecha-
nisms in Active Labor Market Policy" in Nürnberg, and seminar participants at the
Council for Work and Income in The Hague.
†Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Address: Erasmus Uni-
versity, FEW/H 8-34, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail:
buurman@few.eur.nl
‡Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CE-
Sifo, and IZA. Address: Erasmus University, FEW/H 8-15, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR
Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: dur@few.eur.nl
1 Introduction
Street-level bureaucrats often have the dual task of helping some clients while
disciplining others. Caseworkers are a case in point. On the one hand, their
job is to allocate employment services and give job search assistance to clients
who are willing but unable to find a job. On the other hand, they are supposed
to sanction clients who rather live on a benefit than work from 9 to 5.1
The dual nature of the job implies that it is not straightforward what kind
of people should optimally be hired by such street-level bureaucracies. While
the helping aspect of the job makes altruistic or client-oriented people the
ideal candidates, these people are likely to take clients’ interests too much
into account when encountering clients who should be sanctioned. In addition
to this normative issue of what would be optimal candidates, the positive is-
sue of what kind of people find a career in a street-level bureaucracy actually
worthwhile is perhaps even more important. While assessment centers and
talented HR managers may give agencies a glimpse of job applicants’ moti-
vations, their true motivations often remain hidden, implying that agencies
should use other, more implicit instruments to promote self-selection of the
most desired types of workers. These may include paying low base salaries
and offering bonuses for good performance.
This paper studies these issues by developing a model of a street-level
bureaucracy that serves different types of clients, some of which are in need
of help (willing but unable clients) and others who should be sanctioned
(non-willing clients). In addition, there exists a group of clients who should
neither be helped nor sanctioned (willing and able clients). The agency hires
bureaucrats whose task is to meet clients, assess their type, and allocate either
help, no help, or a sanction. Bureaucrats are hired from a pool of potential
job applicants who differ in their altruism towards clients they meet, ranging
from complete indifference to highly altruistic. The agency cannot observe
job applicants’ types. However, it can affect the sorting of job applicants by
its personnel policy. We study two different settings which are often observed
in practice: 1) the bureaucracy pays a base salary only; 2) on top of the base
salary, the bureaucracy offers agents bonus pay or nonpecuniary rewards for
good performance (or, equivalently, gives penalties for bad performance). We
obtain the following results.
1Other examples of street-level bureaucrats with such dual tasks easily come to mind.
For instance, teachers’ main task is to help students learn, but from time to time their
job also involves expelling disruptive students from the classroom. Soldiers taking part
in peacekeeping missions often engage in both humanitarian activities and combat. And
police officers both help and sanction people.
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First, when bureaucrats’ compensation consists of a base salary only, the
bureaucrats’ decisions are in line with the agency’s preferences, except for
the allocations to non-willing clients. Thus, willing and unable clients receive
help while willing and able clients get no help. However, as bureaucrats are
(weakly) altruistic towards clients, bureaucrats do not sanction non-willing
clients, but allocate no help instead. The most altruistic types among the
potential job applicants self-select into the bureaucracy. Besides the base
salary, the attractiveness of the job depends on the composition of the client
population. In particular, the job becomes more attractive, and hence the
base salary can be lower, when there are more clients in need of help. If the
agency has monopsony power, we show that it can be optimal to hire fewer
agents than necessary to serve all clients, so as to reduce salary costs. Our
model thus offers an explanation for why street-level bureaucracies are often
plagued by limited resources and an overload of clients, as observed by e.g.
Lipsky (1980).
Second, bonus pay (or nonpecuniary rewards) for good performance in-
duces the least altruistic among the hired bureaucrats to sanction non-willing
clients. Generally, it is optimal for the agency to set bonus pay such that it
induces only part of the bureaucrats to sanction: Some bureaucrats care so
much about the feelings of non-willing clients that it is too costly to induce
those bureaucrats to impose sanctions. Besides affecting bureaucrats’ deci-
sions, we show that bonus pay can be used by the agency to extract rents
from the most altruistic bureaucrats. Since these bureaucrats do not sanc-
tion, a rise in bonus pay increases their income by less than the income of
bureaucrats who do sanction. Optimal bonus pay is therefore higher than the
value of sanctioning for the agency.
Third, the effect of pay-for-performance on the sorting of agents into bu-
reaucracy crucially depends on whether the expected joys of helping the will-
ing and unable clients exceed the expected sorrows of sanctioning non-willing
clients. If the client population consists mainly of people in need of help, and
the willing clients’ benefit from help is high relative to the unwilling clients’
pain of sanctions, there is still self-selection of the most altruistic types into
the job. If this condition does not hold, the only way through which the
agency can make sure that at least some of its agents sanction non-willing
clients is by offering a combination of base salary and bonus pay that is more
generous than the agents’ outside option. As a result, there is sorting from
both the top and the bottom of the altruism distribution, with highly altru-
istic agents choosing no sanction for the non-willing clients and earning low
income and agents with a low level of altruism imposing sanctions and earn-
ing high bonus pay. When the bureaucracy values sanctions for non-willing
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clients sufficiently, the bureaucracy optimally sets personnel policy such that
it only hires agents from the bottom of the altruism distribution. We thus
show that bonus pay can have a profound impact on the type of workers
self-selecting into street-level bureaucracies.
We proceed as follows. The next section describes how our paper relates
to the literature and discusses some stylized facts about the motivation of
caseworkers, which we take as the leading example in our paper. Section 3 de-
scribes the model. Section 4 analyzes the simple case where bureaucracies pay
flat wages. Next, section 5 studies the implications of pay-for-performance.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature and some stylized facts
Our paper contributes to a recent literature in economics on incentives and
workers’ motivation in the public sector (Francois, 2000 and 2007, Dixit,
2002, Glazer, 2004, Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Prendergast, 2007, Delfgaauw
and Dur, 2008 and 2009, Brekke and Nyborg 2008, and Vlassopoulos 2008).
Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide a survey of this literature. Closest
to our paper is Prendergast (2007) who studies sorting of purely altruistic
agents into a street-level bureaucracy and shows that, generally, both the
most and least desired types self-select into bureaucracy. There are four
key differences between his paper and ours. First, we focus on jobs which
involve a dual task of helping some clients and sanctioning others. Second,
Prendergast (2007) focuses on effort provision of the agents, assuming that
agents cannot lie about the client’s type. In contrast, we assume that agent’s
information about client’s type does not involve effort cost and is soft, giving
discretion to the agent in his allocation decision. Third, while in Prendergast
(2007) bureaucrats earn flat wages, we allow bureaucracies to use incentives.
Last, we assume that agents are impurely altruistic in the sense that they
only care about clients they meet and we abstract from hostile agents. We
discuss the implications of these last two assumptions along the way.
There is abundant evidence that a substantial part of people working
in street-level bureaucracies are concerned about clients. Lipsky (1980: 72)
observes that “Those who recruit themselves for public service work are at-
tracted to some degree by the prospect that their lives will gain meaning
through helping others.” More recently, Le Grand (2003: 38) concludes that
a part of public service employees (the ‘act relevant knights’ in his terms), are
“motivated by the need to perform the helping acts themselves”. Other re-
cent empirical studies showing that public sector workers often have a strong
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intrinsic motivation to help clients include Edmonds et al. (2002) and Frank
and Lewis (2004).
Caseworkers are perhaps the clearest example of street-level bureaucrats
with dual tasks (helping some clients while sanctioning others). There is a
rich empirical literature studying the motives and client-orientation of case-
workers. Blau (1960: 347) studies the attitude towards clients of personnel in
a public welfare agency and concludes that “Most persons who took a job in
the welfare agency were partly motivated by an interest in working with and
helping poor people. They tended to look forward to establishing a warm,
although not intimate, relationship with deserving and grateful clients, and
considered the case worker as the agent of society who extended a helping
and trusting hand to its unfortunate members.” Marston et al. (2005: 146)
provide strong evidence for client-advocacy in a Danish employment project.
They cite a bureaucrat as saying that: “How am I supposed to activate peo-
ple who are running around in the streets without a home— I can’t (...) but
I need to give them a temporary place to stay— or do something for them.”
Heckman et al. (1996: 2) find that caseworkers in a US job-training pro-
gram have “a strong desire to aid the least well off.” Lastly, Considine (2000:
290) finds that Australian caseworkers do not like to sanction clients: “They
found it off-putting to subject job-seekers to the framing of highly legalistic
agreements in their first weeks.” They also “saw sanctioning as a last resort
which implied a breakdown in their service and thus a loss of face for them
and their agency.”
However, not all street-level bureaucrats and caseworkers have such warm
feelings towards clients. Hernandez et al. (2003: 15-16) interviewed partici-
pants to vocational rehabilitation programs. While 21% of the participants
report having a counselor who is committed, 29% find their counselor unre-
sponsive, “particularly when they failed to return telephone calls and follow
through with specific tasks that were discussed during appointments (for ex-
ample, offering but never providing job placement services).” Using Swiss
survey data, Behncke et al. (2007: 8-9) also find striking differences between
caseworkers’ attitudes towards clients. In their sample, 52% of casework-
ers state that “the wishes of the unemployed should be satisfied”. However,
9% of caseworkers “assign placements in jobs and active labour market pro-
grammes independent of the wishes of the unemployed”. Lastly, Blau (1960:
347) notices that a few of the caseworkers in his study were motivated by
considerations such as a desire to dominate people.
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3 The model
Our model revolves around a principal (the benefit administration or public
employment service) with S clients (unemployed workers or people on social
benefits). The principal hires an endogenous number of agents (casemanagers
or caseworkers) to serve these clients. The task of an agent is to meet clients
and to allocate to each of them either an employment service, a sanction,
or no help at all. Employment services can consist of schooling, job search
assistance, assessments et cetera. A sanction can be a pecuniary penalty, but
also a non-pecuniary penalty, for instance workfare where the client is obliged
to do production work. For convenience, we normalize the number of clients
each agent meets to one.
In what follows, we describe the possible allocations and associated payoffs
to the principal, agents, and clients, which are summarized in table 1.
Principal The principal’s preferred allocation depends on the client’s type.
Clients differ in two respects: their motivation and their ability to find a
job. For convenience, we assume that clients belong to either one of the
following four types.2 The first type of clients, denoted by l, is willing to
work, but not able to find a job without help. They need assistance in
the form of employment services to improve their labor skills or to increase
the effectiveness of their job search effort. When a client of type l receives
employment services, the principal’s payoff Up increases by b− c > 0, where
b represents the gains from clients finding a job and leaving welfare with a
higher probability, and c stands for the costs of the employment services.
Without help, the willing but unable clients would not likely find a job,
leaving the principal a payoff we normalize to zero. Giving them a sanction
is considered to be unfair by the principal. The principal would receive some
kind of payment z: the money collected from the penalty, the production
value of the client under workfare, or possible positive effects of sanctions
on the probability of leaving welfare and finding a job (see for instance Van
den Berg et al., 2004). However, the principal loses x (well-being) from the
wrongful treatment of the willing client. The principal’s net payoff from this
allocation is assumed to be negative, z − x < 0.
The second type of clients, denoted by m, is willing and able to find a
job. The best decision for the principal would be not to help those clients
resulting in a payoff we normalize to zero. Giving them employment services
2Our labelling of clients resembles the ones mentioned in e.g. Marston et al. (2005:
149), Sol et al. (2007: 21), and Bunt et al. (2008: 37).
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would entail costs, but does not help them to find a job faster, resulting in
a payoff of −c < 0 for the principal. A sanction would be considered unfair,
implying a payoff of z − x < 0, as is the case for the first type of clients.
The third type of clients is able to find a job, but not willing to do so. The
fourth type of clients is neither willing, nor able to find a job. We label these
last two types by their common denominator: the non-willing, n. According
to the principal they should all receive a punitive sanction for misbehavior,
resulting in a payoff z > 0.3 Allocating them employment services is a waste
of money, −c < 0.4 Allocating no help to them leaves the principal a payoff
normalized to zero.
The principal knows the distribution of clients’ types, but does not know
the type of each individual client. He needs agents to sort this out for him
and allocate the right service to his clients. The principal has a monopoly in
supplying allocations: Clients cannot choose who monitors their job search
behavior. The principal pays each agent a base salary w, which lowers the
principal’s payoff. Further, the principal may use incentives which are dis-
cussed below. Hiring agents to make allocations is only optimal when the
principal’s utility from doing so is equal to or higher than the principal’s
reservation utility, that is allocating all clients the same treatment. We as-
sume throughout that the principal always finds it worthwhile to hire a strictly
positive number of agents. The principal hires agents from a pool of R het-
erogenous individuals which is sufficiently large (R > S) so that the principal
is never supply-constrained. Further, the principal is a monopsonist in the
labor market for agents. This assumption only plays a role in the subsections
where we derive the number of agents the principal wants to hire. We shall
also discuss what happens when the principal has no monopsony power; that
is, competes with other bureaucracies for agents.
Clients Clients are fully informed about their own willingness and ability
to find a job. The utility of a client, Uc, depends on his type and on the
allocation made to him. Like the principal’s payoff, we normalize clients’
payoff to zero in case they receive no help. All clients dislike sanctions. These
give them a negative payoff, −v < 0. Because willing and unable clients
like to have a job and need help to find it, they appreciate employment
3In addition to the monetary payoff of imposing a sanction, there could be some feelings
of satisfaction or justification that a non-willing client gets punished. To save on notation,
we ignore these potential benefits.
4Although this might seem a strong assumption, relaxing it does not change our results
much as long as the non-willing clients dislike employment services or as long as a sanction
should be allocated as well.
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Table 1: Payoff to principal, client and agent of different allocations
Client’s type Allocation Payoff
Principal Client Agent
Willing, unable l Sanction z − x− w −v w − θjv
No help −w 0 w
Employment
services
b− c− w k w + θjk
Willing, able m Sanction z − x− w −v w − θjv
No help −w 0 w
Employment
services
−c− w 0 w
Non-willing n Sanction z − w −v w − θjv
No help −w 0 w
Employment
services
−c− w −g w − θjg
services. This gives them a positive payoff, k > 0. Willing and able clients are
indifferent between receiving employment services and no help.5 Non-willing
clients prefer receiving no help and enjoying their leisure time to participating
in employment services, which gives them a negative payoff −g. Receiving
employment services is, however, preferred to getting a sanction, −v < −g <
0.
There are L > 0 willing and unable clients,M > 0 willing and able clients,
and N > 0 non-willing clients. The total number of allocations, denoted by
Q, is endogenously determined by the principal (through his decision on the
number of agents he wishes to hire), but cannot exceed the total number of
clients, Q ≤ L+M +N = S.
Agents As soon as an agent meets a client, he knows the client’s type.
Hence, investigating a client does not involve cost of effort and, when the
agent allocates a service or sanction, he is always fully informed about the
5If the willing and able clients strictly prefer no help to participating in employment
services, our results do not change. If they strictly prefer participating in employment
services to receiving no help, there is an additional incentive problem, but our main argu-
ments remain unaffected. In this case, the clients’ and principal’s preferences differ in two
respects instead of one.
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client’s willingness and ability to work.6 Agent’s utility Ua depends first of
all on his base salary w (see table 1). Second, the agent may be altruistic
towards the client he meets. This is represented by θjUc, where θj measures
agent j’s altruism towards his client, and Uc is the utility of the client the
agent meets. Since agents only have altruistic feelings towards clients they
meet, they are impurely altruistic or have ‘warm glow’ preferences in the
sense of Andreoni (1989, 1995). We assume that for any j, 0 ≤ θj ≤ θ <
1,7 and that in the population of potential agents the altruism parameter θ
is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
R θ
0
f (θ) dθ.
Importantly, an agent’s altruism is private knowledge. Altruistic agents take
into account how their allocation decisions affect clients’ welfare. Without
significant loss of generality, we assume that whenever the agent is indifferent
between allocations, the agent gives priority to what the client prefers. When
the client is also indifferent, the agent decides to allocate what the principal
prefers. The agent will only accept the job as a caseworker when his expected
utility from doing so is equal to or above his reservation utility, A¯.
Incentives As we shall see, the principal’s and agents’ preferences are not
always in line. Hence, the principal may want to use incentives. For simplicity,
we shall restrict attention to the following simple incentive scheme: The
principal pays the agent a bonus, denoted by π, for each correct allocation,
and does not overrule wrong allocations. For instance, we can think of a bonus
for job placements when correct decisions lead to maximum job placements.
Overruling is not possible, because when the principal observes the outcome,
time has passed and the allocation has already been put into effect. The
same holds when agents are rewarded for not deviating too much from a
benchmark. The bonus for the agents can take a pecuniary or non-pecuniary
form; for convenience, we shall speak of pecuniary bonuses henceforth.8
Timing The principal offers a contract, describing the base salary and
bonus. Each agent decides whether or not to take the job. Then, each agent
who took the job meets a client and takes a decision about the allocation.
Lastly, the clients’, principal’s and agents’ payoffs are realized.
6We thus abstract from the issue of how much effort an agent exerts to determine the
correct allocation which is central in Prendergast (2007).
7We also discuss along the way what would happen when some agents have negative,
hostile feelings towards their clients (θj < 0), as in Prendergast (2007).
8It is straightforward to show that bonuses for correct decisions and penalties for wrong
decisions (such as layoff in case of bad performance evaluations) yield equivalent results.
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4 Flat wages
We start by analyzing the case where the principal gives no incentives (π = 0)
and just pays a base salary w.9 We solve the game by backward induction
and start by agents’ decisions on allocations.
4.1 Which allocations do agents make?
The principal’s and agents’ preferences align when agents meet clients who are
willing to work. When meeting a client who is willing but unable, agents allo-
cate employment services, because this gives these agents a payoff of w+θjk,
which is higher than the payoff of allocating a sanction, w−θjv, or allocating
no help, w. When meeting a client who is willing and able, agents’ payoff of
allocating no help is w, which is equal to the payoff of giving employment ser-
vices and higher than the payoff of sanctioning, w− θjv. Whenever an agent
is indifferent between allocations, he makes the allocation the client prefers.
And if the client is indifferent too, the agent takes the decision the principal
prefers. In this case: no help. However, when meeting a non-willing client,
the principal would prefer that agents allocate a sanction, but the agents
allocate no help instead, resulting in a payoff of w. This payoff is higher than
when they impose a sanction, w− θjv, or give employment services, w− θjg,
because these allocations harm non-willing clients. So, the agents’ decisions
are not fully in line with those desired by the principal: Agents are not willing
to sanction the non-willing clients, as the agents want to avoid the negative
feelings they get from imposing sanctions on clients. Instead, they allocate
no help to these clients.
4.2 Which agents take the job?
An agent takes the job when his expected utility from taking the job is higher
than or equal to his outside option utility, EUa ≥ A¯. Using our previous
results on agents’ allocation decisions, the expected utility for agent j from
taking the job is
EUa = w +
Lkθj
L+M +N
. (1)
9A practical example of this is discussed by Riccuci and Lurie (2001: 34), who con-
clude that “there are neither ‘carrots’ nor ‘sticks’ to motivate the workers” in the social
welfare offices in Texas, Michigan and Georgia. Even though these offices use performance
measures, “workers said that all front-line welfare workers are likely to receive the same
performance ratings” (Riccuci and Lurie, 2001: 35).
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That is, the agent enjoys his base salary and, with probability LL+M+N , helps a
willing and unable client, which raises his utility by kθj. The agent derives no
such additional utility when encountering a willing and able client or when
encountering a non-willing client because, as we have seen, the agent will
allocate these clients no help. Since Lk > 0, the participation constraint can
be written as:
θj ≥ eθ = ¡A¯− w¢ ∙ LkL+M +N
¸−1
. (2)
We can distinguish three cases for the threshold level of agent’s altruism eθ.
First, eθ > θ. In this case, nobody is willing to take the job. Second, ifeθ ≤ 0, then the whole labor force is willing to apply. In the third and most
interesting case where 0 < eθ ≤ θ, only agents with a sufficiently high level of
altruism are willing to take the job. We focus on this third case.10 Notice that
this implies that A¯−w > 0: The base salary does not make up for foregoing
the outside option. The reason is that the job gives agents an opportunity to
help willing but unable clients, which increases altruistic agents’ utility.
The self-selection of the agents is affected by the composition of the client
population, the quality of employment services and sanction policy, and the
principal’s personnel policy. We discuss the influence of these aspects in turn.
Client population The higher the number of willing and unable clients,
the more attractive the job becomes for altruistic agents, because there are
a lot of clients needing employment services and thus a big chance of getting
the warm feelings of helping them. So even for agents with a relatively low
level of altruism θj, the job becomes interesting:
∂eθ
∂L
=
−k
¡
A¯− w
¢
(M +N)
(Lk) 2
< 0.
The higher the number of willing and able clients, the less interesting the job
becomes. These clients need no help. Thus there are lower expected benefits
from helping clients to compensate for the low-paying job:
∂eθ
∂M
=
A¯− w
Lk
> 0.
10When we would allow for agents with θj < 0 (hostile agents), we would get a result
similar to Prendergast (2007). That is, agents from both ends of the spectrum, with very
positive and very negative attitudes to clients, take the job. The latter would impose
sanctions on all types of clients as they enjoy making people worse off.
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The same holds for the number of non-willing clients. Because the agents do
not impose sanctions, the agents avoid the negative feelings this would evoke
for the clients and thus themselves. But they do not get positive feelings of
helping clients either. When there are more of these non-willing clients, less
people are willing to take the job:
∂eθ
∂N
=
A¯− w
Lk
> 0.
Employment services and sanction policy The employment services
offered by the bureaucracy can be more or less attractive to clients. Clients,
for example, often like employment services where they themselves can have
a say. The more attractive the employment services for clients, the more
interesting the job becomes for agents:
∂eθ
∂k
=
−L
¡
A¯− w
¢
(L+M +N)
(Lk) 2
< 0.
Making the sanction policy more or less fierce has no effect in the flat-wage
case, because agents do not impose sanctions anyway:
∂eθ
∂v
= 0.
Personnel policy The principal in this case has a simple personnel policy:
He only offers a base salary, w. Raising this salary makes the job attractive
to a larger number of agents:
∂eθ
∂w
=
− (L+M +N)
Lk
< 0. (3)
4.3 Optimal personnel policy
We have seen that agents are willing to take the job when they are sufficiently
altruistic; more precisely, when condition (2) holds. But how many agents
does the principal want to hire? Recall that each agent makes one allocation.
Using equation (2), the total number of allocations can be written as Q =
R
R θ
hθ f (θ) dθ. Further, using our results on agents’ allocation choices in section
4.1, the principal’s expected payoff of hiring an agent is LL+M+N (b − c) − w.
Hiring an agent increases the number of employment services allocated to
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willing and unable clients, but comes at the cost of paying the base salary.
The principal’s optimization problem can thus be written as
max
w
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w
¸
R
Z θ
hθ
f (θ) dθ,
where eθ is described by equation (2). The first-order condition describing the
optimal base salary is:
∂EUp
∂w
=
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w
¸
Rf(eθ) ∙ Lk
L+M +N
¸−1
−R
Z θ
hθ
f(θ)dθ = 0.
(4)
The condition shows us that by raising the base salary the principal attracts
a number of additional agents, Rf(eθ) £ LkL+M+N ¤−1. This raises the principal’s
expected payoff as these agents allocate employment services to the willing
and unable clients, and lowers his payoff by the salary he has to pay themh
(b−c)L
L+M+N − w
i
. Raising the base salary also implies that the principal has to
pay higher salaries to all agents he hires, which costs −R
R θ
hθ f (θ) dθ. In the
optimum, the principal equates these marginal benefits and costs or, if the
resulting number of potential allocations exceeds the number of clients, hires
S agents. Importantly, the principal may optimally choose to hire too few
agents to serve all clients. This stems from the principal’s monopsony power:
To attract more agents, he must increase all agents’ base salary, which may
not make up for the payoff resulting from an increase in allocations. Hence,
insufficient staffing and an overload of clients may be an optimal choice. If
the principal lacks monopsony power, either all or none of the clients would
be served, depending on whether the market wage is lower or higher than the
expected payoff of an allocation.
5 Pay-for-performance
As we have seen in the previous section the principal and agents’ preferences
are not always in line: Agents do not sanction non-willing clients. Can the
principal change the behavior of the agents and at what cost? In this section
we investigate what happens when the principal rewards agents with a bonus
π > 0 for each correct allocation made, without overruling the agents’ allo-
cations when a wrong decision has been detected.11 As discussed in section
11Alternatively, the principal may give a bonus only when an agent imposes a sanction.
This incentive scheme, however, induces some agents to sanction not only non-willing
12
3, an example of such an incentive scheme is making agent’s pay dependent
of his clients’ labor market performances.12
5.1 Which allocations do agents make?
Agents’ allocations to the willing and unable clients (employment services)
and to the willing and able clients (no help) were already in line with the
preferences of the principal in the flat-wage case studied above. Pay-for-
performance does not change the agents’ allocations to these clients; it only
increases the payoff to the agents of making this allocation by π. However,
when the agent meets a non-willing client, bonus pay may induce an agent to
impose a sanction rather than to allocate no help. His payoff of sanctioning
becomes w + π − θjv, while the payoff of allocating no help remains w and
the payoff of allocating employment services remains w − θjg. Hence, if the
bonus π is high enough, the payoff of sanctioning is higher than the payoff of
allocating no help. More specifically, an agent will give non-willing clients a
sanction when his level of altruism is lower than the threshold level:
θj < bθ = π/v. (5)
When θj ≥ bθ = π/v, the agent’s decision is not affected by the bonus: He
allocates no help to the non-willing clients, because the bonus does not com-
pensate for the negative feelings the agent experiences when sanctioning a
non-willing client.
5.2 Which agents take the job?
As before, an agent applies for the job when his expected utility from the job
is higher than his outside option utility, EUa ≥ A¯. We need to distinguish
two groups of agents: Those that sanction non-willing clients and those that
do not.
clients, but also the willing and able clients, which is costly to the principal. Restricting
the bonus for correct allocations to a bonus for correct sanctions only does not affect any
of the main results; it merely leads to an increase in the base salary as the agents’ expected
bonus pay goes down.
12Klerman et al. (2005: 129) observe such individual rewards for caseworkers in Cali-
fornia, as does Weissman (1997: 37) in Los Angeles County and Burgess et al. (2004) in
Jobcentre Plus in the UK. For example, caseworkers having more than 10 job placements
in the preceding month got rewards such as free movie tickets or banners with their name
on it.
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The agent does not sanction
³
θj ≥ bθ = π/v´ The agent’s expected util-
ity, equation (1), changes into:
EUa = w +
(L+M)π
L+M +N
+
Lθjk
L+M +N
≥ A¯,
implying the following participation constraint:
θj ≥ eθ = µA¯− w − (L+M)π
(L+M +N)
¶ ∙
Lk
L+M +N
¸−1
. (6)
Compared to the case of flat wages, the participation constraint has changed
in only one way: The agent earns a bonus π for the allocations to willing
clients (L+M). All comparative statics have the same sign as in the absence
of bonuses, except for the effect of a higher number of willing and able clients:
∂eθ
∂M
=
A¯− w − π
Lk
≷ 0.
While, as before, a higher number of willing and able clients reduces the
expected nonpecunairy payoffs from the job, pay-for-performance implies that
it now increases the expected pecuniary payoffs. Hence, the number of agents
willing to take the job may now increase or decrease with the number of willing
and able clients. Further, note that an increase in the bonus makes the job
more attractive:
∂eθ
∂π
=
− (L+M)
Lk
< 0.
This effect is smaller than that of raising the base salary (which is again given
by (3)), because agents who do not sanction only receive the bonus when
encountering willing clients. As we shall see, this has important implications
for the optimal level of the bonus.
The agent sanctions
³
θj < bθ = π/v´ Expected utility of agents who op-
timally decide to sanction non-willing clients reads:
EUa = w + π +
θj (Lk −Nv)
L+M +N
≥ A¯,
implying the following participation constraint:
if Lk −Nv > 0, then θj ≥ eeθ = ¡A¯− w − π¢ ∙ Lk −Nv
(L+M +N)
¸−1
; (7)
if Lk −Nv < 0, then θj ≤ eeθ = ¡A¯− w − π¢ ∙ Lk −Nv
(L+M +N)
¸−1
. (8)
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First, consider the case where Lk − Nv > 0. That is, given that an agent
sanctions non-willing clients, the job brings higher expected joys of helping
the willing and unable clients than expected sorrows of sanctioning the non-
willing clients. Then, as before, only agents with a sufficiently high level of
altruism are willing to apply for the job, eeθ ≤ θj ≤ θ. Compared to agents who
do not sanction, pecuniary payoffs are higher, because the agent gets a bonus
for every allocation he makes. Non-pecuniary payoffs are lower, however,
because the agent suffers a loss when sanctioning non-willing clients. As
before, the principal pays less than agent’s outside option utility
¡
w + π < A¯
¢
,
for otherwise all agents in the economy would apply for the job.
Next, consider the case where Lk −Nv < 0. It is easy to see that in this
case, if the expected pecuniary payoffs are smaller than the outside option
utility, w + π < A¯, only agents with hostile feelings θj <
eeθ < 0 would be
willing to apply. However, we have assumed θj ≥ 0 for any j, and so if the
principal wants to attract agents who choose to sanction non-willing clients,
he must offer w + π ≥ A¯. Agents interested in a job like this are the ones
with low levels of altruism, those that do not care too much about the clients’
feelings, 0 ≤ θj ≤ eeθ, as described by (8).
The comparative static results are similar to those derived above with two
exceptions. First, raising the bonus has the same effect as raising the base
salary, because agents who sanction receive bonuses for all allocations they
make, rendering the base salary and bonus pay perfect substitutes:
if Lk −Nv > 0, then ∂
eeθ
∂w
=
∂eeθ
∂π
=
− (L+M +N)
Lk −Nv < 0;
if Lk −Nv < 0, then ∂
eeθ
∂w
=
∂eeθ
∂π
=
− (L+M +N)
Lk −Nv > 0.
Although the signs are opposite in the two cases, the interpretation is the
same: Raising the bonus or base salary attracts more agents, in the first
case from the top and in the second case from the bottom of the altruism
distribution (see (7) and (8)). Second, making the sanction policy more harsh
(raising v) makes agents less willing to apply for the job:
∂eeθ
∂v
=
N
¡
A¯− w − π
¢
(L+M +N)
(Lk −Nv) 2 ,
which is positive if w + π < A¯ and negative if w + π > A¯, both implying
that fewer agents apply. In the first case, some agents from the top no longer
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apply, while in the second case some agents from the bottom are no longer
interested in taking the job (see (7) and (8)).
5.3 Optimal personnel policy
By setting the base salary w and the bonus π, the principal determines the
number of agents that will be hired as well as affects their allocation decisions.
Following the analysis in the previous subsection, there are two cases that
need to be distinguished: The case where the expected nonpecuniary payoffs
of the job for agents willing to sanction are positive, Lk −Nv > 0, and the
case where these are negative, Lk −Nv < 0.
Nonpecuniary payoffs positive when agents sanction (Lk −Nv > 0)
In this case, the job is mainly a job of helping needy people getting a better
chance on the labor market, even for agents who sanction non-willing clients.
Hence, as we have seen, the job is particularly attractive to altruistic agents.
Using our results on the allocations agents make (section 5.1) and which
agents take the job (section 5.2), we know that, if the principal decides to
induce at least part of the agents to sanction non-willing clients, R
R θ
eθ f(θ)dθ
allocations will be made by agents who are willing to take the job but not
willing to sanction, and R
R eθ
hhθ f(θ)dθ allocations will be made by agents who
are willing to take the job and sanction non-willing clients. The resulting
expected payoffs to the principal of these two groups of agents are respectivelyh
(b−c)L
L+M+N − w −
(L+M)π
L+M+N
i
and
h
(b−c)L+zN
L+M+N − w − π
i
per agent. The principal’s
optimization problem can thus be written as:
max
w,π
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w − (L+M) π
L+M +N
¸
R
Z θ
eθ
f (θ) dθ+ (9)
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
R
Z eθ
hhθ
f (θ) dθ
where bθ is described by (5) and eeθ by (7). It is easy to verify that the par-
ticipation constraint of agents who do not sanction, described by (6), is not
binding, unless bθ ≤ eθ. In the latter case, the bonus is too low to induce any
agents to sanction non-willing clients and, hence, the optimization problem
is the same as in the case of flat wages, which we studied in the previous
section. If bθ > eθ, the first-order conditions for the optimal base salary and
bonus are:
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∂EUp
∂w
=
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
Rf(eeθ) ∙ Lk −Nv
L+M +N
¸−1
−R
Z θ
hhθ
f(θ)dθ = 0
(10)
∂EUp
∂π
=
N (z − π)
L+M +N
Rf(bθ)1
v
+
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
Rf(eeθ) ∙ Lk −Nv
L+M +N
¸−1
− L+M
L+M +N
R
Z θ
eθ
f(θ)dθ −R
Z eθ
hhθ
f(θ)dθ = 0 (11)
Raising the base salary w has the same effects as in the case of flat wages,
except that the additional agents sanction non-willing clients (which raises the
marginal benefits) and need to be paid bonuses (which reduces the marginal
benefits). Furthermore, as before, when raising the base salary, the principal
has to pay a higher salary to all agents, which is reflected by the last term of
(10). Due to this monopsony effect, the principal may again optimally choose
to hire too few agents to serve all clients.
Raising the bonus π has three effects. Firstly, it induces Rf(bθ) 1v agents
to sanction and receive a bonus rather than allocate no help to non-willing
clients. This results in a total increase of the principal’s payoff described by
the first term in (11): The principal gains z from each additional sanction
to non-willing clients at the cost of paying an additional bonus π. Secondly,
as for the base salary, by raising the bonus the principal attracts additional
agents willing to sanction, which is reflected by the second term in (11).
Notice that this term is identical to the first term in (10), which reiterates
our result above that raising the base salary or the bonus have the same
effect on recruitment of agents willing to sanction. Lastly, the marginal costs
of raising the bonus are described by the last two terms of (11): Agents are
compensated better for correct decisions.
In the optimum the principal equates the marginal benefits and costs of
raising the bonus and of raising the base salary. Combining the first-order
conditions gives:
(π − z) f(
bθ)
v
=
Z θ
eθ
f(θ)dθ,
which implies that the optimal bonus π exceeds the value to the principal
of sanctioning a non-willing client (z). The intuition follows. By raising the
bonus, some additional agents are induced to impose sanctions, which raises
the principal’s payoff by (π− z), as discussed above. Hence, it is optimal for
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the principal to raise the bonus at least to the point where the bonus equals
the value to the principal of sanctioning non-willing clients. This echoes
the familiar result that, with risk-neutral agents, optimal bonus pay equals
the full marginal product. However, there is an additional benefit of raising
the bonus. Recall that an increase in the bonus enables the principal to re-
duce the base salary by the same amount without losing any agents, because
the bonus and base salary are perfect substitutes for the marginal agents.
Expected wage compensation for agents who do not sanction decreases, how-
ever. They bear the full loss of the reduction in the base salary, but gain
only partly from the increase in the bonus as they do not sanction. Raising
the bonus thus enables the principal to extract rents from the agents who do
not sanction non-willing clients. In the optimum, the bonus therefore exceeds
the principal’s value of sanctioning non-willing clients.13 Nevertheless, if θ is
sufficiently high, the optimal bonus does not induce all agents to sanction
non-willing clients. The principal simply finds it too costly to induce highly
altruistic agents to impose sanctions.
Nonpecuniary payoffs negative when agents sanction (Lk −Nv < 0)
In this case, the job is mainly about disciplining instead of helping clients for
agents who find it optimal to impose sanctions on non-willing clients. As we
have seen in section 5.2, in order to induce at least some of the agents to sanc-
tion non-willing clients, the total pecuniary payoffs of the job for these agents
must at least be equal to the outside option utility, w+π ≥ A¯, implying that
some agents from the bottom of the altruism distribution sort into the agency.
Using our previous results on which allocations agents make (section 5.1) and
who will take the job (section 5.2), we know that R
R hhθ
0
f (θ) dθ allocations are
made by agents willing to sanction and R
R θ
hθ f (θ) dθ allocations are made by
agents not willing to sanction.14 The principal’s optimization problem can
thus be written as:
13Obviously, more sophisticated separating contracts may enable the principal to extract
even more rents from the altruistic agents. We leave an analysis of this for future research.
Note also that rent extraction can only occur when the principal has monopsony power.
When there are many identical principals, competition rules out rent extraction, and the
optimal bonus π is equal to the principal’s value of sanctioning a non-willing client (z).
14Using (5), (6), and (8), it is easy to verify that in all cases where the principal hires
neither all nor none of the potential agents, it holds that eeθ < bθ < eθ. In other words, none
of the agents hired from the top of the altruism distribution sanction, while all agents
hired from the bottom do sanction non-willing clients. Hence, the incentive constraint (5)
is redundant.
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max
w,π
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
R
Z hhθ
0
f (θ) dθ+ (12)
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w − π (L+M)
L+M +N
¸
R
Z θ
hθ
f (θ) dθ,
where eθ is described by (6) and eeθ by (8). The first-order conditions are:
∂EUp
∂w
=
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
Rf
µeeθ¶∙− Lk −Nv
L+M +N
¸−1
+
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w − π (L+M)
L+M +N
¸
Rf
³eθ´ ∙ Lk
L+M +N
¸−1
−R
Z hhθ
0
f (θ) dθ −R
Z θ
hθ
f (θ) dθ = 0 (13)
∂EUp
∂π
=
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
Rf(eeθ) ∙− Lk −Nv
L+M +N
¸−1
+
∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w − π (L+M)
L+M +N
¸
Rf(eθ) ∙ L+M
L+M +N
¸ ∙
Lk
L+M +N
¸−1
−R
Z hhθ
0
f(θ)dθ − L+M
L+M +N
R
Z θ
hθ
f(θ)dθ = 0 (14)
The first term in (13) shows that, as before, by raising the base salary w, the
principal attracts more agents who are willing to sanction. However, in this
case, he also attracts more agents who are not willing to sanction, resulting
in additional payoffs described by the second term of (13). Furthermore, the
principal has to pay a higher salary to all agents, described by the third and
fourth term in (13), which can lead to the same monopsony result for the
optimal number of allocations as before: Too few agents to serve all clients.
The first two terms in (14) show that by raising the bonus, the number of
agents willing to sanction as well as the number of agents not willing to
sanction increase. Finally, the last two terms of (14) describe the increase
in bonus paid to all hired agents. Combining the first-order conditions and
rewriting gives:
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∙
(b− c)L
L+M +N
− w − π (L+M)
L+M +N
¸
f
³eθ´ ∙ Lk
L+M +N
¸−1
=
Z θ
hθ
f (θ) dθ.
∙
(b− c)L+ zN
L+M +N
− w − π
¸
f
µeeθ¶∙− Lk −Nv
L+M +N
¸−1
=
Z hhθ
0
f (θ) dθ,
Clearly, in the optimum, the principal hires agents from the top and the
bottom of the altruism distribution until the expected gains from hiring ad-
ditional agents from each group are equal to the increase in rents he has to
leave to this group of agents. Highly altruistic agents do not sanction non-
willing clients and are paid low income and agents with low altruism sanction
and earn high bonus pay. Hence, when the nonpecuniary payoffs of the job
are negative for agents who sanction, pay-for-performance has a profound
effect on the sorting of agents. While in the case of flat wages, only the most
altruistic types opt for the job, with pay-for-performance sorting from the
top and bottom of the altruism distribution results. When the value to the
principal of sanctioning non-willing clients, z, is sufficiently high, it may even
be optimal for the principal to hire agents from the bottom of the altruism
distribution only. The same holds when θ (the most altruistic agent’s degree
of altruism) is sufficiently low. In these cases, the benefits of hiring the most
altruistic agents (low wage costs) do not compensate for the costs (that some
non-willing clients do not get a sanction). However, the opposite may also
be the case. When the value of sanctioning is sufficiently low or when there
is sufficient mass of highly altruistic agents, the principal does not find it
worthwhile to offer high pecuniary payoffs so as to attract agents who are
willing to sanction. This results in sorting of the most altruistic types only,
as in the case of flat wages.
6 Concluding remarks
We have studied the effects of pay-for-performance in street-level bureaucra-
cies where agents have the dual task of helping some clients while disciplining
others. Our theoretical work has some clear predictions which can be tested
in future empirical research, e.g. using data such as those used by Behncke
et al. (2007) combined with data on how agents are compensated. In partic-
ular, our study suggests that pay-for-performance can have important effects
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on the self-selection of agents into street-level bureaucracies. While orga-
nizations paying flat wages are predicted to be attractive mainly to highly
altruistic (or client-oriented) types, organizations using pay-for-performance
are also (and sometimes only) attractive to agents who have a neutral stance
towards clients. Further, our analysis predicts that understaffing (as mea-
sured by, e.g., unexplained differences in caseloads per agent, see Bloom et
al. (2003)) is related to the degree of competition between agencies and to
the composition of their client population. More specifically, our results sug-
gest that bureaucracies facing less competition in the labor market for agents
are more likely understaffed, and the more so when their clients more likely
qualify for help or a sanction.
While we have focussed on pay-for-performance as a means to align the
agents’ and principal’s interests, there are of course several other ways to
do so. We discuss three of these alternatives here. A first alternative is to
monitor (a part of) the agents’ allocations before they are put into effect and
to punish and overrule an agent when a wrong allocation is detected (see e.g.
Van der Veen 1990). In an earlier draft of this paper, we explored this case.
If the agent only cares about the effects on the client’s welfare of his own
decisions and not those by the principal, the results are similar to the case
of pay-for-performance studied above. However, some results change when
we assume that the agent, once he has met the client, cares also about how
clients are affected by later decisions taken by the principal. Then, like bonus
pay, monitoring induces part of the bureaucrats with lower levels of altruism
to sanction non-willing clients. But when the monitoring rate is sufficiently
high, there are further consequences for sorting: Sorting into the job from
the bottom of the altruism distribution only, even by agents not willing to
sanction. The reason is that, with a high monitoring rate, the agency is
likely to overrule the bureaucrat when observing that the bureaucrat has not
imposed a sanction on non-willing clients. When the bureaucrat’s sorrows of
these sanctions are larger than the joys of helping others, the job is no longer
attractive to altruistic people and the agency needs to offer a relatively high
wage to attract people who will all be little concerned about clients’ welfare.
A second alternative way of aligning the principal and agents’ interests is
to advise the agent on what allocation to make using a statistical assignment
program which uses data on clients’ characteristics (profiling). Many coun-
tries use such a procedure (see OECD, 2007, Black et al., 2003, Rosholm et
al., 2004). One reason to introduce profiling is to avoid casemanagers’ bias.
Or, as Bell and Orr (2002: 281) put it, to promote that “identical persons
will get the same treatment, regardless of who their caseworker might be”.
Profiling constrains agents’ room for discretion if the agency penalizes agents
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for diverting too often from the advised allocations. This can be considered
as a special case of monitoring and is thus likely to lead to the same results
as described in the previous paragraph.
A third alternative is to use clients’ complaints to find out when a wrongful
decision has been taken by an agent. However, complaints would be unin-
formative in our model, because agents do not sanction willing clients. The
only clients who would complain about sanctions are non-willing clients, who
are sanctioned deservedly. All other allocations are in line with the clients’
preferences. No complaints are to be expected in those cases. Complaints,
however, are informative in models where agents need to exert effort to make
a correct allocation, as studied by Prendergast (2007).
We have abstracted from any private costs to agents of sanctioning clients,
like for example physical threats, lots of paperwork, or the chance to become
engaged in the legal process of sanctions and appeal (see e.g. Considine
2000). Such private costs would make agents even less willing to sanction
non-willing clients. To induce agents to impose sanctions, the bonus would
need to compensate agents for these private costs in addition to the sorrows
arising from agents’ altruism towards clients.
We have assumed that agents differ in their altruism towards their clients,
but that each agent’s level of altruism is the same towards all of his clients.
Thus, we assumed that agents do not discriminate against some clients. But
as Lipsky (1980: 108) observes: “some clients simply evoke workers’ sympa-
thy or hostility (...) workers may be inclined to ‘give the underdog a break’
or may favour clients with similar ethnic backgrounds, as when racial or eth-
nic favoritism prevails in discriminatory decision making.” These feelings can
impact agents’ allocation decisions in important ways. Feelings of reciprocity
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fong et al., 2006, and Fong, 2007) can also play a
role. People tend to treat friendly and deserving people better than hostile
and undeserving people. In our model, reciprocity could imply that agents
treat willing clients more favorably than non-willing clients, thus improv-
ing the alignment of the principal’s and agents’ interests. However, these
reciprocal feelings are in practice not likely to be strong enough to achieve
perfect alignment, which is also clear from the empirical literature discussed
in section 2.
Lastly, an agent’s altruism does not need to be stable over time. As
Blau (1960: 347-348) notices “the attitudes of most new case workers toward
clients were strongly positive, if somewhat sentimental and idealistic (...) But
as he encountered clients who blamed him personally for not helping them
enough (...) and clients met his trusting attitude by cheating and lying, the
newcomer tended to experience a ‘reality shock’ (...) This disillusioning
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experience might make a worker bitter and callous, or induce him to leave
the job, and even those who did not have either of these extreme reactions
tended to change their orientation to clients.” This is clearly an interesting
topic for future research.
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Notation
• A¯ = agent’s outside option utility
• L = number of willing and unable clients (type l).
• M = number of willing and able clients (type m).
• N = number of non-willing clients (type n).
• Q = number of allocations
• R = number of potential agents
• S = number of clients
• Ua = agent’s utility function
• Uc = client’s utility function
• Up = principal’s utility function
• b = principal’s benefit when a willing and unable client receives em-
ployment services
• c = principal’s cost when a client receives employment services
• f(θ) = density function of agents’ types
• g = non-willing client’s cost of employment services
• k = willing and unable client’s benefit of employment services
• v = client’s cost of a sanction
• w = agent’s base salary
• z = principal’s benefit when a non-willing client receives a sanction
• z− x = principal’s net benefit when a willing client receives a sanction
• π = bonus for making a correct allocation
• θ = agent’s level of altruism towards clients
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